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EXPLAINING EARLY WELFARE POLICIES IN SOUTH KOREA:




This study discusses conditions that contributed to creating the coordinated market
economy in South Korea, and how that affected welfare policy development as industri-
alization of South Korea advanced. The study shows that the group-coordinated market
economy such as the Japanese or the South Korean political economy would not have
been possible without a distinctive role of the state in nurturing the coordinated market
economy. In contrast to the industry-coordinated market economy of Europe, the
group-coordinated market economy of South Korea had nothing to do with generous
welfare state development. A weak union movement and conservative politics based
upon the authoritarian state’s alliance with big business did not contribute to welfare
state development in South Korea. Instead, the state’s success in establishing a coordi-
nated market economy through nurturing big companies and cultivating cooperative
labor mobilization encouraged the development of company-based social benefits. While
company-based cooperative institutions were placed in companies, various corporate
benefit programs and health benefits for industrial workers in larger companies further
developed. The state established the institutional frame in which employers rather will-
ingly participated in welfare provision for industrial workers. This was accompanied by
the lack of state-responsible welfare provision.
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Welfare
INTRODUCTION
South Korean social policy raises puzzling questions about the relation-
ship between capitalism and the welfare state. The South Korean political
economy was one of the most dramatic success stories of the second half of
the last century. Rapid economic development since the 1960s spectacularly
increased incomes, made widespread mass education possible, and signifi-
cantly raised life expectancy. However, welfare policies remained very
‘ungenerous’ throughout this entire period. On average, South Korean
social spending between 1990 and 1996 accounted for only 3.57 percent of
the GDP, and 16.86 percent of public expenditure (OECD, 1999). This was
much less than other industrialized countries spent. In most western soci-
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eties, economic development had been intertwined with growing public
spending for a comprehensive social policy that protected citizens from fluc-
tuations of the market economy and other life risks. In South Korea, welfare
state building has shown much less progress than expected, as compared to
its rapid industrialization.
Above all, the role of the East Asian state in social development has
received much attention. Thus far, state-centered studies on East Asian wel-
fare policies have been effective in criticizing ‘essentialism’ of cultural stud-
ies and pointing out political aspects of welfare policy development
(Goodman and Peng, 1996; Kwon, 1999). The main point of these studies is
that ruling elites in these countries, while single-mindedly pursuing rapid
economic development as the best survival strategy, had pragmatic interests
in the development of social welfare programs when they needed to gain
political legitimacy during political crises. This means that social welfare
policies developed incrementally and haphazardly, which reflected the
state’s interests in the process of overall nation-building. Professional
bureaucrats made major contributions in adopting foreign welfare pro-
grams in an innovative way. Other social actors like unions and business
organizations did not assume a major role in this process of welfare policy
development. Right-left political struggles mattered little.
Undeniably, some degree of autonomy is given to bureaucrats or policy
experts in proposing policies and writing the contents. State bureaucrats
and social experts played a crucial role in studying welfare programs and
codifying their implementation in South Korea. It can further be seen that
welfare policy development was more or less shaped by state bureaucrats’
incremental and pragmatic adaptation of western programs (Goodman and
Peng, 1996: 211). However, these state-centered studies need to expand their
analytical perspectives. As Huber and Stephens (2001) point out, the deci-
sion of state bureaucrats or policy experts depends on the political orientation
of the government in power that is shaped by power relations in society.
Therefore, we need to elaborate on government’s policy choices in a power-
based perspective.
Of course, state-centered studies are particularly useful in understanding
the early development of special social programs for civil servants and sol-
diers in South Korea.1 As many South Korean scholars point out, the mili-
tary junta in the early 1960s used “social security as an instrument for politi-
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1 Private school teachers were also relatively well protected by social security programs.
The protection of teachers largely reflected the government’s interests in mass education dur-
ing early industrialization. Private school teachers were incorporated into South Korea’s social
security system in the late 1970s.
cal legitimacy” (Shin, 2003: 63). By providing higher social status, higher
wages and higher social benefits, the military government wanted to secure
loyalty from these groups so that they could serve the government. We can
find many similar cases in Latin American authoritarian states. However,
what we keep in mind is that political legitimacy mattered little to most
South Koreans when democracy was repressed and subordinate groups
were not well-organized. The military government used social security as
an instrument of political legitimacy for only a few groups, and not for the
general public or the working-class. Broad-based social programs were
developed much later and began to protect a significant part of the popula-
tion when social movements against the authoritarian rule became much
stronger in the late 1980s.2
This study pays attention to the early development of social welfare for
industrial workers, and explains the way in which social welfare for indus-
trial workers was shaped by state actions. While the state was passive and
neglectful of workers’ social benefits in the 1960s, it became more active in
shaping the way in which welfare was provided to industrial workers
beginning in the 1970s. To understand this, the study largely makes an effort
to investigate state actions in coordinating economic actors, to use the con-
ception of the varieties of capitalism school (Hall and Soskice, 2001).
Incorporating an institutional perspective from the school of varieties of
capitalism, this study simultaneously points out that the institutional
approach of this school also requires a power-based perspective. State
actions in coordinating economic activities and economic actors stand out in
the context of South Korean development, and at the same time, such state
actions in economic development are tightly related to power relations.
This study will analyze how South Korean welfare policies had a different
development, as compared to those of European coordinated market
economies that have been analyzed by the varieties of capitalism school.
The study will show that state actions in coordinating economic actors in
South Korea were crucial in making the business sector provide social bene-
fits to industrial workers, which resulted in the lack of public welfare provi-
sion for both industrial workers and the broad population. Studies on wel-
fare states have analyzed the various links among important welfare
providers such as the state, the market (including the business sector), and
the family (Esping-Andersen, 1999). The analysis of this study focuses on
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2 The industrial accident insurance program for a small percentage of industrial workers
was implemented in the early 1960s. However, this program was not implemented as a social
right given to workers, but it was rather a “state-administrated insurance for employers who
were liable to the compensation of industrial accidents (Shin, 2003: 64).”
the nexus between the state and the business sector.3 The study will explain
how this nexus was developed, and in what particular historical context in
South Korea.
STATE, COMPANY, AND SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY
The varieties of capitalism school has been conceptually articulating the
influence of specific types of coordination of economic actors on welfare
state development (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Soskice, 1999). According to this
view, the coordinated market economies are associated with generous wel-
fare states, and the uncoordinated market economies with less generous
welfare states. The coordinated market economies, such as Germany and
Sweden, rely on non-market institutions, formal or informal, in coordinat-
ing economic actors: sharing information among firms as well as between
firms and banks (or investors), building trust and reputation, co-investing in
and monitoring vocational training, and building cooperation between
firms and employees. Collective goods relevant to production are produced
through long-term contracts between economic actors. In this institutional
context, generous welfare benefits serve to keep highly-skilled labor for
high-quality production, which employers strongly support. In contrast, the
liberal market economies such as the UK and the United States do not have
non-market coordinating institutions, and thus they rely heavily on market
institutions. Competitive strategies that the liberal market economies are
seeking are based upon low labor costs and highly flexible labor supported
by deregulated labor market policy, which does not allow employers to be
supportive of generous welfare benefits.
The linkage between ‘production regime’ and ‘welfare regime’ has also
been analyzed by Huber and Stephens (2001) through the balance-of-class-
power perspective. They found that the coordinated market economies clus-
ter with the social democratic welfare regime or Christian democratic wel-
fare regime, whereas the uncoordinated market economies cluster with the
liberal welfare regime. However, while recognizing the usefulness of the
varieties of capitalism approach in characterizing different production
regimes and their relationships with welfare states, Huber and Stephens
argue that the balance-of-class-power perspective remains vital in interpret-
ing the relationship between the varieties of capitalism and the welfare
state. They emphasize that the most important promoter of welfare state
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3 The nexus between the state and the business sector has been one of the important areas of
welfare state studies. See Shalev (1996).
expansion is not the rational, strategic choices of business organizations, as
much of the literature of the varieties of capitalism school emphasizes, but
rather partisan politics. Without strong unions and social democratic par-
ties, coordinated market economies and generous welfare states would have
not been able to be sustained together over time. This implies that as impor-
tant as the employer’s contribution is to welfare state development, the
employer’s contribution to welfare state expansion depends on the balance-
of-class-power relations once again.
Interestingly, the Japanese and South Korean models are also mentioned
as the coordinated market economy by the varieties of capitalism literature.
It is analytically important that this model is distinguished from other coor-
dinated market economies: the group-coordinated market economies of
Japan and South Korea vs. the industry-coordinated market economies of
the Nordic and Continental European countries. The difference between
these two is that coordination takes place within the industrial sector or
branch in the industry-coordinated market economy, whereas it takes place
within the group of companies in the group-coordinated market economy.
The industry-coordinated market economy is characterized by “industry-
defined unions, technology transfer and diffusion within the industry, tech-
nical norm setting within the industry, as well as by training of engineers
and other high-level specialists within an industry technology framework,
and industry-based development of vocational training standards” (Soskice,
1999: 106). The group-coordinated market economy is characterized by
more intense coordination between companies within the group of compa-
nies, such as Japan’s keiretsu and South Korea’s chaebol: “[C]ompany-based
unions, technology diffusion and development within the group of compa-
nies, technical standard setting within the group, and vocational training as
a company-based and not an industry-based phenomenon” (Soskice, 106)
are prominent characteristics of the group-coordinated market economy.
However, the literature of the varieties of capitalism point out that both
types share many things with each other: long-term financing of companies;
cooperative industrial relations; collective efforts in developing a vocational
training system, group-wide or industry-wide; and cooperative develop-
ment of technology among firms (Soskice, 106-107).
What is odd is that contrary to the industry-coordinated market economy,
the group-coordinated market economy is not strongly associated with a
generous welfare state. Instead, what is distinctive is a greater development
of company-based social benefits. The loyalty of workers to their firms is
gained through “generous” company welfare, as well as through life-time
employment. The question is whether generous company welfare is equiva-
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lent to a generous welfare state. However, generous company welfare over-
all protects less workers than a generous welfare state. How do we explain
this?
Above all, the two types of coordinated market economies are situated in
very different power relations, in the sense that the industry-coordinated
market economy is based upon the strength of organized labor and a very
powerful or relatively powerful social democratic party (Huber and
Stephens, 2001), whereas the group-coordinated market economy has a
weak labor power and the dominance of the conservative party. It is espe-
cially important to understand that the state was an active player in making
the group-coordinated market economy by cultivating and nurturing the
political and social arrangements favorable to this particular coordinated
market economy over a long period of time. Thus, the clue to understanding
the linkage between coordinated market economy and generous company
welfare without the generosity of welfare state programs can be found in
state actions in making the group-coordinated market economy work in a
particular set of historical conditions.
Pempel (1989; 1998) elucidates the ways in which the Japanese state over
time has organized and nurtured the institutional relations of economic
actors favorable for the Japanese political economy, showing that the
Japanese state has played a role in policy-making not in a passive way, but
actively. The Japanese coordinated market economy was specifically orient-
ed toward the goal of rapid economic growth. The goal was clearly set up
by the developmental state and was backed by the conservative coalition. In
Japan, business sectors (big and small business) as well as farmers have sup-
ported, as the major conservative partners, the long-term domination of the
conservative Liberal Democratic Party. Business and farmers have staunchly
supported low government spending and low tax rates. In contrast, orga-
nized labor was politically excluded from this broad conservative coalition
in Japan (Pempel, 1998; 78-79). Politically marginalized, labor was mobilized
into the long-term economic development project only as an economic actor.
No political party with substantial support from organized labor entered
the executive branch of government. Japanese unions were almost exclu-
sively formed along enterprise rather than industrial lines. Thus, labor ’s
interests could be easily identified with those of the firm, and workers’ par-
ticipation was largely confined to various cooperative relations with compa-
nies.
In general, cooperative industrial relations, which were “institutionally
necessary” for the coordinated market economy, also contributed to a devel-
opment of generous company welfare in Japan. As Shinkawa and Pempel
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(1996) show, the Japanese state played a very important role in encouraging
companies to create firm-specific social benefits through public policy such
as tax benefits to help companies opt out of public social programs. The
interesting result is that compared to the liberal market economies such as
the United States, in Japan, a more systematic development of generous
company welfare with life-time employment within the group of companies
and also across groups took place. The Japanese state indeed coordinated
companies’ efforts in developing firm-specific benefits broadly, specifically
across larger companies, so that defectors from the coordinating efforts
could be minimized under the authority of the state.
The South Korean state also succeeded in cooperating with big companies
for rapid economic growth. In fact, the cooperation between the state and
private business was described as one of the essential elements in effective
state intervention in the South Korean economy (Amsden, 1989; Evans,
1995; Kim, 1997; Wade, 1990). An effective form of coordination of economic
actors also required the state’s incorporating labor into capitalist develop-
ment in South Korea, which was aimed at meeting two conditions: “effec-
tive political demobilization” and “effective economic mobilization” (Choi,
1989). The state actions in coordination of economic actors were framed
based on a narrowly defined cooperation between the state and society that
primarily benefited private business. The state was willing to cooperate on
joint projects only with the business sector (Evans, 1995). Meanwhile, the
state restrained labor’s political rights by banning unions’ participation in
political parties and confining union activities to economic matters within
their firms. Thus, enterprise unions gained strength over time and, at the
same time, company-centered, non-union institutions or non-union activi-
ties for improving labor cooperation were directly encouraged by the state.
The following sections discuss how this form of coordination shaped wel-
fare state development in South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s (before the
late 1980s).4 The study will focus on the relationship between the state and
big business, and the responses/choices of big business regarding labor
relations and labor welfare. The reason is that the alliance between the state
and big business was critically important in social development as well as
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4 We need to analyze social welfare politics since the late 1980s in a different perspective,
reflecting the democratic context and new political actors. We need to understand that the
previous policy legacy tends to shape the politics of social welfare policy in the new socio-eco-
nomic environment, as a comparative historical approach suggests (Mahoney, 2001;
Rueschemeyer and Stephens, 1997). As Rueschemeyer and Stephens (1997) point out, the past
persists throughout history because once social patterns are established, they are highly resis-
tant to change. Therefore, understanding earlier welfare policies is important in analyzing
welfare policies developed at a later point.
economic development. In the context of South Korean economic develop-
ment, it was the growth of the big business sector that facilitated social poli-
cies suited for producing a healthy and well-trained labor force. Then, how
was this necessity promoted? In South Korea, social welfare development
should be understood as related to the state’s efforts to make the enterprise
serve as an institution for channeling state policies. Instead of public welfare
programs for a broad protection of the working-class, company welfare pro-
grams for a narrow protection of the working class were earlier and better
developed. On the other hand, the state’s success in coordinating economic
actors for rapid economic growth did not contribute much to developing
broad-based social programs in South Korea.
One thing that deserves mentioning here is that this study analyzes the
health insurance program for industrial workers in the context of company
welfare development. The health insurance program was developed as a
social security program to be regulated and operated by the government,
which was different from other voluntary company welfare. However, what
is interesting is that employers agreed on the implementation of this pro-
gram because they thought they could use this program as one of their wel-
fare items. The study will show that the health insurance program was not
developed as a social right given to the working class by the state, but it was
initially developed as privately-provided, “paternalistic” company welfare.5
Therefore, the health insurance program was organized as a workplace-
based health insurance society, which gave employers great discretion to
operate the program and utilize the health fund. At the same time, the gov-
ernment minimized its regulation.6
CONDITIONS FOR THE COORDINATED MARKET ECONOMY: STRONG
STATE AND BIG BUSINESS
One of the conditions for the coordinated market economy in South Korea
was the increase in state power. The Yushin (the Revitalized Reform)
Constitution of 1972 decisively reinforced the conferring of decision-making
power on the president in the 1970s. The Presidential Emergency Measures
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5 “Privately-provided” means “provided by the private business sector.”
6 This is why at a later point employers and labor unions resisted health insurance reform
and argued that the health insurance fund was in reality the private fund that had been con-
tributed to only by employers and employees without the state’s contribution. Employers’
organizations and labor unions applied the same logic to the national pension fund in the
process of pension reform in the 1990s. The national pension was also funded by employers
and employees without the state’s contribution.
under the Yushin regime basically prohibited any political activities against
the government. Whenever national security, order or public welfare was
perceived to be in danger by the government, restrictions upon civil rights
and freedoms were justified by the Constitution (Pae, 1992: 296). Under the
new Constitution, the president dissolved the National Assembly and
appointed one third of the legislators (Lee, 1993: 105). The primary purpose
of this action was to secure more than two-thirds of the total members of the
National Assembly by combining his political party politicians with one-
third of the total assembly seats of his own choice (Pae, 1992: 296). Since the
National Assembly was occupied by more than a two-thirds majority of
politicians favored by the president, legislators were vulnerable because
they were easily expelled for any challenges to the president, who was him-
self protected from impeachment (Pae, 296).
The president directly used his power to influence policy-making. The
Presidential Secretariat played a crucial role in the economic policy-making
process. The economic secretariat was staffed by highly ranked bureaucrats
— from minister to vice minister and assistant minister (Lee, 1993: 59). After
the establishment of the Yushin Constitution of 1972, the Presidential
Secretariat was even more strengthened, not just in economic policy-mak-
ing, but also in all other policy matters. Park’s personal and informal
reliance on a few special assistants was of primary importance in his deci-
sion-making. President Park himself became the final decision-maker
regarding all important issues (Lee, 125-127).
The center of the decision-making process remained with the president in
the 1980s under the Chun Doo Hwan government, which inherited and
maintained its predecessor’s authoritarianism. According to Kwon (1999)
and Park (1996), the Presidential Secretariat was weakened to some degree
as the capabilities of the ministries were enhanced through their recruitment
of professional bureaucrats and accumulated experience. The Chun regime
also revised the National Assembly Election Law so that more than half the
seats could be safe from any opposition parties by introducing the assign-
ment of the seats based upon proportional representation. The winning
party took two-thirds of the proportional seats, while the rest were divided
among other parties (Pae, 1992: 311).
Given the centralization of state power in South Korea, the ruling party as
well as opposition parties had little political leverage in the policy-making
process. This had been clearly reflected in the active role of the executive
body in legislation. The share of the executive-initiated bills among the total
bills passed increased dramatically from about 56 percent in the 1960s to
about 84.6 percent in the 1970s. The dominant position of the executive
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body was most clearly seen in the fact that, of the total bills submitted by
the executive, the percentage passed by the National Assembly increased
from about 72 percent in the 1960s to about 96 percent in the 1970s (Park,
1996: 130). This high proportion continued in the 1980s, although it did
decline somewhat to 90 percent.
This increase in state power, which became the key to the state-run coor-
dinated market economy in South Korea, contributed to the dramatic
growth of big companies, after the Third Five-Year Economic Development
Plan began heavy and chemical industrialization in South Korea. The enor-
mous growth of big companies proved a necessary condition for the coordi-
nated economy. The most distinctive public policy important in promoting
heavy and chemical industrialization was shifting the government’s previ-
ous approach to its policy loans for nurturing export industries — from gen-
eral policy loans, not industry- or firm-specific, within the export industries
to policy loans assisting specific firms and industries. According to Woo’s
(1991: 166-9) study, on average, export industries always received more
favorable loans than domestic industries. And most importantly, heavy
industries had greater access to various kinds of loans than light industries
had. Particularly, large-sized industries were favored over small businesses.
It was during this same period that large businesses with investments in
heavy and chemical industries grew faster than ever before. Economic
power was concentrated toward large business groups, the chaebol (the
Korean conglomerates), as opposed to small and medium enterprises. The
chaebol established itself firmly in the South Korean economy during this
period and continued to expand its dominance in the national economy. The
thirty largest companies owned by the top ten largest chaebol as of 1986
produced total sales equivalent to more than 65 percent of South Korea’s
GNP of 1986 (Fields, 1995: 35).
COORDINATION BETWEEN WORKERS AND EMPLOYERS: WORKERS’
COOPERATION AND EMPLOYERS’ WELFARE PROVISION
Company-Coordinated Mobilization and Company Welfare
As important as fostering big companies was in creating the South Korean
model of the coordinated market economy, the authoritarian state had to
develop a special form of labor mobilization so that labor could be coordi-
nated with rapid economic growth policy and pro-chaebol policy. Labor
mobilization in South Korea above all came with a strong repression of
labor movements. Imposing more restrictions on workers’ collective actions
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became more apparent after 1970, along with a further weakened democra-
cy conditioned by the new Constitution.
Given strict restrictions on collective action, labor was generally confined
to administrative issues. Although policy consultant bodies were instituted
with some government departments to deal with labor issues, and the
Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU)7 was increasingly invited to par-
ticipate in these policy consultant bodies, the participation of the FKTU was
limited generally to labor administrative issues only (Gam, 1994).
Substantively repressed and politically excluded, unions and workers were
incorporated into the state-led economic development in a special way:
company unions and company-based labor cooperation established since
the 1970s became a critical instrument to that particular labor incorporation.
The government’s effort to enforce labor collaboration was accompanied
specifically by the enterprise-based labor mobilization. To reinforce the
enterprise-based labor mobilization, the government tried to replace unions
with more cooperative institutions within the enterprise, that is, labor-man-
agement councils. The Labor-Management Council Law was legislated by
the Park regime in 1963, but it was the amendment to the Labor Union Law
of 1975 that required all unionized firms and encouraged non-unionized
firms with more than 30 employees to establish labor-management councils
(Ministry of Labor, 1983: 13; Ha, 1992: 153). The main function of the council
as defined by the law was improving mutual consultations on issues such as
technical education, work environment, and grievance handling, etc.,
through regular meetings between employers and employees (Choi, 1989:
178). Although the councils expanded significantly, the role of these councils
was not clearly defined. Most employers were reluctant to meet their labor
representatives, largely because they did not want to share managerial
power with their employees.
Compared to this, employers were more active in complying with the
Factory Saemaeul (new village) Movement during the same period (Choi,
1989: 180-1). The Factory Saemaeul Movement was more clearly defined in
respect to its goals and function. The Factory Saemaeul Movement, which
began as a government-led campaign for the improvement of rural regions,
was extended to factories. The specific goals of this movement were the
improvement of labor productivity, the reduction of the cost of production,
and the creation of family-like enterprises (Lee, Shin, and Kim, 1983).
Especially, work ethic was inculcated in the enterprise as the key to the sur-
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union at the national level, structured along industrial lines in South Korea in the 1960s and
1970s.
vival of the South Korean economy that had signaled significant deteriora-
tion, specifically after the oil shock of 1973. In each enterprise, numerous
Saemaeul work teams were organized and also encouraged to work with
labor-management councils. It was in this period that enterprise-based wel-
fare programs started to develop. Labor unions were obliged to compete
with these organizations, worsening an already harsh situation that unions
had to deal with. Most unions had tremendous difficulties in strengthening
their roles.
The Labor-Management Council Law was obligatory for unionized enter-
prises, but still just a recommendation for non-unionized ones until the
amendment to the Labor Union Law of 1981 was written. The difference in
the 1981 Law was that labor-management councils were legally required in
both unionized sectors and non-unionized sectors with more than 100
employees. The law more clearly defined the purposes and functions of
these organizations (Ministry of Labor, 1983). The law also specified the
duties and powers of labor-management councils by stipulating the scope of
the items that they were allowed to discuss at their regular meetings. The
new Labor-Management Council Law allowed councils to discuss all mat-
ters except wages (Ha, 1992: 221; see Table 1).
The mobilization of labor in the enterprise was extended through the revi-
sion of other South Korean labor laws in the early 1980s. One dramatic
change was the structure of labor organization: it was transformed from
industrial unionism to enterprise unionism. Local unions were reorganized
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TABLE 1. LABOR-MANAGEMENT COUNCIL MEETINGS AND THEIR SUBJECTS: SOUTH
KOREA, 1981-1985 (NUMBER, %)
Major Subjects
Year Meet
Training Prevention Griev- Safetyings
Product- Labor & educa- of labor ance &(no.)
ivity welfare tion disputes handling health Others Total
1981 37,905 16,063 26,587 5,176 2,231 21,380 7,633 20,410 99,480
1982 24,180 12,377 19,924 2,900 1,622 9,882 5,199 5,199 66,600
(18.6) (29.3) (4.5) (2.4) (14.8) (7.8) (21.9) (100.0)
1983 23,786 14,473 19,192 3,067 1,314 7,714 6,572 12,990 65,322
(22.8) (29.4) (4.7) (2.0) (11.8) (10.1) (19.9) (100.0)
1984 24,960 14,628 17,959 4,440 1,629 8,933 7,445 14,182 69,216
(21.1) (25.9) (6.4) (2.4) (12.9) (10.8) (20.5) (100.0)
1985 21,631 9,231 18,927 2,757 1,682 4,247 6,269 17,514 60,627 
(15.2) (31.2) (4.5) (2.8) (7.0) (10.3) (28.9) (100.0)
Source: KEF (1986: 69).
along the enterprise line and they were given the right to bargain collective-
ly, if only at the enterprise level. In addition to this change, potentially dam-
aging the organizational power of the working class, organization of unions
was made more difficult by the new requirement of a minimum number of
workers for union registration (O’Neill, 1991: 387). Furthermore, the Law of
the Prohibition of Third Parties forbade the national labor organization,
FKTU to intervene in any enterprise-level collective bargaining (Ha, 1992:
217-8; O’Neill, 1991: 387). The FKTU was further weakened by this amend-
ment.
While the unionization level declined in the early 1980s, labor-manage-
ment councils grew fast and were established in all targeted companies
(KEF, 1986: 68-9). The absolute number of union members decreased from
1,088,000 in 1979 to 948,000 in 1980. It was not until the mid-1980s that the
number of union members returned to the number of 1979 (1,036,000 in
1986) (National Statistical Office, 1998). Union density - union members as a
proportion of the total number of employed workers - also declined from
16.8 percent in 1979 to 13.2 percent in 1984 (Koo, 1993: 149). On the other
hand, labor-management councils increased from 4,720 in 1981 to 5,627 in
1985 (KEF, 1986: 68-9).
Employers’ organizations participated more actively in the establishment
of the councils in the 1980s, which was in contrast to the previous attitude of
employers under the Park Chung Hee government. Unionized sectors and
non-unionized sectors had almost the same number of the councils in 1986
(ibid.: 69). The absolute number of councils was smaller compared to the
1970s due to the reduction of the targeted companies (from companies with
over 30 employees to ones with over 100 employees), but the specified roles
defined by the binding regulation helped to actualize the operations of the
councils. The most important issues discussed by the councils were produc-
tivity and labor welfare expansion (Ministry of Labor, 1987; see Table 1).
Employers, particularly, showed their willingness to work with these
councils. According to the annual report from the Korea Employers’
Federation (1982), employers by themselves participated in 91 percent of the
regular meetings held by councils in 1981. A weakened union function and
a placement of company unions/non-union activities in companies helped
to create cooperative labor mobilization in South Korea. Labor productivity
was the priority of all these activities, and many labor welfare issues had
been discussed as an incentive to labor cooperation.
A mandatory retirement benefit program was the single most important
company welfare provided by employers. The retirement program account-
ed for the largest proportion of non-wage labor costs, according to reports
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from the Ministry of Labor (Survey Reports on Labor Cost of Enterprises, vari-
ous years). However, mandatory retirement benefits did not function so
much as an income support for the old-aged as it did as an unemployment
benefit that would be given to workers leaving companies after at least a
one-year service.8 Other programs included various projects to meet
employees’ basic needs such as mess hall, dispensaries, and the operation of
a company cooperative. More important were housing loans and scholar-
ship programs (Song, 1995).
Over time, employers developed a positive attitude toward company wel-
fare expansion, although they had a variety of motivations and these moti-
vations changed over time. Not only “improvement of labor productivity”
but also “recruitment of labor force,” “preventing labor disputes,” and
“promoting firm-attached values and attitudes” were reported by employ-
ers as good reasons to be positive about company welfare expansion (see
Table 2). Overall, employers’ interests in company welfare indicate that
employers sought to gain direct benefits for themselves from the programs.
Their responses show their honest interests in such programs.
In sum, the government made enormous efforts to improve labor produc-
tivity by establishing labor-management councils and company unions. This
form of enterprise-based labor mobilization was closely related to the
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8 In addition, a lump-sum retirement payment could not really play a role as a long-term
income support for the elderly. As of 1983, 99.9 percent of the retirement beneficiaries were
those under age 50. Only 0.1 percent were those over age 60 (Korea Development Institute,
1986).
TABLE 2. EMPLOYERS’ OBJECTIVES OF COMPANY WELFARE PROGRAMS: SOUTH KOREA
(%)
Year
Objective 1977 1986 1988
• Improvement of labor productivity 40.1 19.9 21.2
• Recruitment of labor force 8.5 59.5 9.9
• Preventing labor disputes 11.3 30.2
• Promoting firm-attached values & attitudes 5.8 9.3 38.7
• Helping with stabilization of livelihood 32.2
for employees
• Supplement to social security 4.1
• Improvement of human relations 4.1
• Indirect wage increases
• Etc 4.9
Source: Choi (1992: 58).
expansion of company welfare (Choi, 1989). We can argue that retirement
wage compensation and various other social benefits provided by compa-
nies were a compensation to labor for accepting the state-led coordination of
the economy under the authoritarian regimes in the 1970s and the 1980s.
Health Insurance
Interestingly, the health insurance benefit, finally implemented in 1977
and gradually expanded in the 1980s, well exemplifies employers’ active
role in establishing the coordination of workers and employers during this
period. Even though health insurance was not a private corporate benefit by
definition, it was developed along corporate lines. I argue that indeed, the
development of health insurance can be explained by the very factor that
accounted for company welfare development: cooperative labor mobiliza-
tion along enterprise lines.
Although the Health Insurance Act of 1963 required companies to estab-
lish voluntary health insurance programs, it did not succeed in increasing
coverage until the mid-1970s. Some experimental health insurance projects
covered only a small percentage of the population (Kwon, 1999: 89). Despite
a low percentage of health insurance coverage and poor quality of public
health delivery, during the Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan
(1972-1976), the implementation of national health insurance was not seri-
ously considered by the government. Development of health insurance
based upon the 1963 law had been continuing within the government
agency, but without the president’s approval it was impossible for bureau-
crats to push the health insurance plan forward.
The influence of North Korea has been suggested as one of the major fac-
tors in explaining why Park suddenly engaged in health insurance develop-
ment. After the historical dialogue between North Korea and South Korea
took place in 1972, Park became more sensitive to the North Korean propa-
ganda proclaiming the superiority of the North Korean social security sys-
tem, especially free access to health care (Lee, 1993). The inter-state competi-
tion was an important factor in pushing Park to take a close look at the fea-
sibility of a broad-based health insurance system. Surprisingly, Park
declared at his New Year’s news conference of 1976 that during the Fourth
Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1977-1981), the entire population
would have access to medical benefits (Cha, 1992: 264-5).
To explain the development of health insurance in this period requires
more than pointing to Park’s fear of losing his legitimacy. Even after his
public announcement, Park was hesitant in pursuing national health insur-
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ance because he did not want to increase the government’s financial burden.
He intended to introduce medical assistance programs only for the poor. In
fact, during his annual visit to the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs,
Park stressed the urgency and importance of health care programs for low-
income families rather than universal health insurance. Extending health
benefits to public employees and even private school teachers was investi-
gated with the possibility of the government’s financial contributions dur-
ing the same period. In contrast, the government did not consider its finan-
cial contributions to national health insurance for the broader population.
A factor that eventually changed the direction of the president from
assisting only the poor to insuring the broader working population was
business organizations’ positive responses to a health insurance plan
(FKMIS, 1997). The Federation of Korean Industries (FKI, representing big
companies, typically the chaebol) expressed interest in the government’s
health insurance plan. Although the health insurance plan regained atten-
tion as an urgent issue for political reasons, it was not a new issue to large
companies, which had already provided their employees with some form of
medical benefits such as financial assistance for employees’ medical treat-
ment. The backdrop for these changes was a remarkable period of growth in
the industrial sector and in big companies in particular. The government’s
policy loans favorable to big business for promoting heavy and chemical
industries contributed to the expansion of big business since the early 1970s.
By 1977, the labor force in industry increased up to 25.1 percent of the whole
from 9 percent in 1960 and 17 percent in 1970 (World Bank, 1984). The
Ministry of Labor also reported that as of 1980, big companies with 300 or
more employees surveyed (across all industries) employed 42.4 percent of
the total labor force (Ministry of Labor, 1990). In reference to health insur-
ance, employers increasingly viewed it as another benefit provided to
employees. The FKI agreed to the basic ideas of the national health plan and
tried to put its own demands on the final health bill.
The ten-year health plan to be included in the Fourth Five-Year Economic
Development Plan specified two types of health insurance programs: (1)
compulsory insurance for industrial workers in businesses with 500 or more
employees and (2) voluntary insurance for all others, except for those quali-
fied for the medical assistance program (Park, 1977: 39). Employers and
employees made the same contribution to the health insurance, while the
self-employed were supposed to pay a certain fixed amount (FKMIS, 1997:
84). The health insurance program was organized to maximize the autono-
my of each unit of operation and to minimize public regulation. A health
insurance society (unit) was to be established at each enterprise or industrial
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park. Each society was an autonomous institution that would operate the
health program under the supervision of the Ministry of Health and Social
Affairs (Park, 1977: 39). It was important to employers to have autonomy of
workplace-based health insurance societies that would allow employers to
put leverage on the use of health insurance as a corporate benefit to their
employees. This did not favor the interest of unions, because only employ-
ers as insurers were allowed to establish workplace-based health societies
and to write the articles of the society without consultation with unions.
There was no significant role assigned to unions in representing workers’
interests in running health insurance (FKTU, 1977).
In the final stage of implementation, the FKI played a crucial role in estab-
lishing health insurance societies at workplaces and in coordinating the
newly established societies. The FKI arranged for the preparation committee
to form the Medical Insurance Association in December 1976 under the
authority of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. The association was
initially created as a private organization to promote and manage a national
health insurance project, and it functioned within the FKI (FKMIS, 1997: 111-
112). On July 1, 1977, 486 health insurance societies were established at
workplaces. All insurance societies joined the National Association of
Medical Insurance Societies, developed from the Medical Insurance
Association.
Without doubt, the role of the employers, especially of big companies,
was critical in extending health insurance to a broader population.
Organized labor did not have a chance to participate in the decision-mak-
ing, since organized labor was politically excluded and organizationally dis-
empowered. Such an active role by the employer may seem surprising.
However, this can be accounted for by the same factor that contributed to
company welfare development. Although the North Korean advanced wel-
fare system was a triggering factor to the extent that Park ordered bureau-
crats to develop something appropriate for political reasons, the process of
health insurance development in the late 1970s shows that health insurance
benefits, similar to various company benefits, were developed to support a
broader system of cooperative labor mobilization, which in turn served to
sustain the state-led coordination of the economy. Employers perceived
health insurance as something that was good for them in sustaining labor
cooperation.
Beginning with companies with more than 500 employees, the health
insurance program gradually expanded in the 1980s. Health insurance bene-
fits in workplaces were expanded to companies with 100 workers or more in
1981, and again to companies with 16 workers or more in 1983 (FKMIS,
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1997). Interestingly, after larger companies first accepted the health insur-
ance program, a significant number of smaller companies voluntarily partic-
ipated in the program before it became a mandatory program. The Ministry
of Health and Social Affairs reported in 1982 that about 78 percent of com-
panies with between 16 and 100 workers already provided employees with
health insurance benefits, even when the coverage was voluntary (ibid.: 274-
275). This suggests that smaller companies also implemented the health
insurance benefit as one of their voluntarily provided corporate benefits.
While the coverage expansion of health insurance benefited the working
population, it had limits to expand and resulted in inequality among the
population. As of 1983, national health insurance covered about 40 percent
of the population (Shin, 2003: 91).9 Most of the urban self-employed and
farmers did not have health coverage. The coverage expansion did not con-
tinue to include the broader population until the late 1980s, when social
movements emerging in the process of democratization in South Korea
pushed the government to reform the health insurance scheme for universal
coverage. Political legitimacy finally mattered to the broad population when
broad-based social movements organized themselves against the authoritar-
ian regime and voiced their own demands.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of the impact of the mode of economic coordination on social
welfare policy in South Korea provides very interesting findings. The
European coordinated market economy and the South Korean coordinated
market economy have opposite consequences in welfare state development.
This can be explained by the power-based perspective and particularly the
state’s role in the market economy and social welfare policies. The balance
of power favorable to organized labor in the European coordinated market
economy, with a strong labor movement and pro-labor or social democratic
parties, was crucial to the development of a comprehensive welfare state. In
contrast, the balance of power unfavorable to organized labor in the South
Korean political economy explains South Korea’s ungenerous development
of welfare policies.
In South Korea, compared to a weak development of public social wel-
fare, company welfare gradually expanded as an important social protection
for industrial workers. This form of social protection was initially shaped by
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9 The medical assistance program covered 9.3 percent of the population as of 1983 (Shin,
2003: 91).
neither democratization nor a stronger labor movement. A more repressive
state and a weakening of the labor movement were prominent among the
causal factors explaining this improvement of social protection for industri-
al workers. The state’s goal of rapid economic growth was realized through
a coordinated market economy, nurturing big companies and enhancing
cooperative labor mobilization. The state established the institutional frame
in which the private business sector rather willingly participated in welfare
provision. Employers provided social protection, including publicly autho-
rized health insurance benefits, to their employees as one of the critical
means of sustaining cooperative labor mobilization.
Company-centered provision of social protection for industrial workers,
however, had a negative impact on welfare state development for the broad-
er working class. We witnessed that the weak labor movement did not have
a chance to mobilize the working class for broad social protection. The
authoritarian state and big capital were not motivated to develop such
broad social protection. The authoritarian state had its economic power base
predominantly in big companies. The state encouraged a narrow social pro-
tection that would benefit big companies. Big companies were led to get
involved in company welfare expansion. On the other hand, the state did
not promote broad social protection at all under the authoritarian regimes in
the 1970s and 1980s. The state never proclaimed itself as a welfare provider.
Rather, it focused on expanding social benefits to those who were already
beneficiaries, such as government employees, soldiers, and schoolteachers.
The South Korean welfare system had existed to transfer resources to those
who were better off at the expense of persons who were economically worst
off during early welfare policy development. Without a strong and broad-
based union movement, social protection for the working class had
remained residual.
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